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INTRODUCTION

The deregulation of the conventional home mortgage market created a
new market for borrowers who were typically excluded from the traditional
mortgage markets'. I Borrowers whose credit is blemished, or whose
income is limited, are excluded from the traditional home mortgage market
because they represent an undue level of risk. The elimination of
borrowing constraints by offering risk-based loans created the subprime
lending market, and thus created more home financing opportunities. 2
Subprime lenders argue that they are contributing to the societal goal of
greater access to credit by offering innovative mortgage products to
traditionally excluded borrowers. 3 That argument ignores an arguably
unintended consequence of the mortgage market's innovation: lenders
target minority communities for exploitative lending practices by providing
loans with terms and conditions that are not warranted by the risks posed to
the borrowers. 4
Numerous statistical studies now prove that there are racial disparities
in lending in the primary and refinance markets. 5 The infusion of minority
loan markets with products that are economically unjustified and
financially harmful represents a perverse incentive for fmancial

1. See generally NORMAN STRUNK & FRED CASE, WHERE DEREGULATION WENT
WRONG: A LOOK AT THE CAUSES BEHIND SAVINGS AND LOAN FAILURES IN THE 1980s (1988).
2. Joseph A. Smith, Jr., The Federal Banking Agencies' Guidance on Subprime
Lending: Regulation with a Divided Mind, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 73, 76-81, 105-07 (2002)
(discussing the federal agencies' classifications of subprime and predatory loans).
3. Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road to Subprime "He!" Was Paved with Good

Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime Home Equity Market, 51
S.C. L. REv. 473,527,539-40 (2000).
4. In two cases alleging that the specific targeting of minority markets is a violation of
the Fair Housing Act, courts have failed to recognize a cause of action. See discussion infra
Part I.B. But courts are recognizing that there is reverse redlining through steering minority
loan applicants to unjustifiably high loan products. See Honorable v. Easy Life Real Estate
Sys., 100 F. Supp. 2d 885, 892 (N.D. Ill. 2000). "Reverse redlining is the practice of
extending credit on unfair terms to those same communities." Id.
5. See CALVIN BRADFORD, CTR. FOR CMTY. CHANGE, RISK OR RACE? RACIAL
DISPARITIES AND THE SUBPRIME REFINANCE MARKET vii, 3-8, 87-106 (2002) (reviewing
statistical data of subprime lending patterns in the mortgage refinance market for the 331
Metropolitan Statistical Areas in the United States) [hereinafter RISK OR RACE?], available
at
http://www .communitychange.orglsharedlpublications/downloadslRisk_or_Race_502.pdf.
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deregulation. 6 Thus, the benefits of deregulation to the financial industry
and to lenders ought to be balanced against the costs that financial
deregulation imposes on minority consumers.
The policy decisions to deregulate the mortgage markets are wrought
with implications. Examining the application of these policies ferrets out
the distribution of those benefits and the attendant costs. The same legal
rules that support financial deregulation have created a socioeconomic
hierarchy, which has produced a system that is hostile to the economic
interests of minorities. 7
Redressing the structural inequities in this economic scheme requires
legislation that treats conduct targeting or improperly assessing the
economic interests of minority homeowners as per se discriminatory.
Thus, changes to the Fair Housing Act are in order. 8 The statute must be
amended to (1) define risk-based pricing, (2) provide guidelines to lenders
on when it is appropriate to use risk-based pricing and the specific
disclosures required to be provided to consumers, and (3) provide an
economic remedy when lenders fail to make the appropriate disclosures.
Structural inequities that bar fair lending will result in grievous harms and
will not be addressed without the needed changes.
I. FAIR LENDING AND ECONOMIC SUBORDINATION

The economic and racial mix of predatory lending and loss of home
ownership requires scrutinizing subprime lending under theories of social
justice and equality.9 Lending and economic development in cities are
inextricably mixed. lO The hypersegregation that affects the inner city is a
6. [d. at 75.
7. See generally Chantal Thomas, Globalization and the Reproduction of Hierarchy,
33 U.c. DAVIS L. REv. 1451 (2000) (discussing the effects of economic globalization and
the creation of socioeconomic hierarchies).
8. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2000).
9. Predatory lending creates racialized economic space. "Racial spaces" refers to the
concentration of minorities in geographical locations primarily due to racial segregation and
discrimination. See generally Anthony Paul Farley, The Poetics of Colorlined Space, in
CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 97-158 (Francisco Valdes et
al. eds., 2002). The demarcation necessarily serves as an identification of a legal and
political reality about the allocation of power. Racialized economic space argues for
explanation on biased outcomes given the supposed neutrality of economic principles. See
infra text accompanying note 25. That explanation requires a parallel focus on the political
structure and the inherent policy choices that converge. See Cassandra Jones Havard,
African-American Farmers and Fair Lending: Racializing Rural Economic Space, 12 STAN.
L. & POL'y REv. 333,340-42 (2001) [hereinafter Jones Havard, Racializing Rural Economic
Space].
10. See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER
CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987) (discussing the conditions that
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critical factor to consider when assessing access to finance in these
communities. II
Hypersegregation creates information barriers that make lending
difficult. 12 Lenders that service hypersegregated communities tend to
ration credit and require substantial collateral. 13 Recognizing this link
provides the foundation for the inquiry into whether lending requirements
in these communities are appropriate, or based on race. 14
One question to answer regarding residential lending is why do
information asymmetries produce risk barriers that lead to loans that are
improperly characterized? Two issues become significant for the lender
making the determination: (1) borrower creditworthiness (given
hypersegregation and property location); and (2) appropriate risk
assessment (given the accumulated equity in property used as collateral in
refinance loans).
The current statutory scheme prohibiting lender
discrimination encourages economic subordination by vesting too much
discretion in the lender to make unbiased credit determinations.
A. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) is a lender-friendly statute
that allows the lender to choose the method of evaluating borrower
creditworthiness. ls Lenders choose which factors to evaluate for a
creditworthiness determination (such as credit history, length of

contribute to persistent poverty, including the unavailability ofa living wage).
II. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 74 (1993) (defining
"hypersegregation" as a pattern of being segregated in all types or dimensions of
segregation); Peter Dreier, America's Urban Crisis: Symptoms. Causes, Solutions, 71 N.C.
L. REv. 1351, 1369-70, 1381-83 (1993).
12. Keith N. Hylton, Banks and Inner Cities: Market and Regulatory Obstacles to
Development Lending, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 197,217 (2000).
13. Id. at 213-18 (discussing the informational asymmetries that lead to small business
and housing disinvestment in urban cities); see also Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Racial
Limits of the Fair Housing Act: The Intersection of Dominant White Images. the Violence of
Neighborhood Purity. and the Master Narrative of Black Inferiority. 37 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 69, 108 (1995) (describing the five dimensions of hypersegregation as: (1) uneven
representation areas; (2) total segregation by race; (3) large, "tightly clustered" contiguous
enclaves or scattered, "checkerboard" enclaves; (4) neighborhoods "concentrated within a
very small area or settled sparsely throughout the urban environment;" and (5)
neighborhoods "spatially centralized around the urban core or spread out along the
periphery").
14. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Privatized Communities and the "Secession of the
Successful": Democracy and Fairness Beyond the Gate, 28 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 1675, 168183 (2001).
15. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-169lf(2000).
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employment, and income), but are prohibited from discriminating based on
specified factors. 16 Courts have uniformly rejected claims by borrowers
who have challenged a lender's credit denial based on the lender's
evaluation standard. 17
Pursuant to the ECOA, the Federal Reserve Board issued "Regulation
B,,,18 which governs the evaluation criteria that lenders may use. The
regulation expressly states that creditors may not use facially neutral
evaluation practices that have a discriminatory effect. 19 The regulation
governs both statistical and judgmental scoring lending. 2o
The Interagency Task Force on Fair Lending Policy Statement has
interpreted the ECOA to allow the lender to demonstrate that a challenged
practice is a business necessity.21 Consequently, a lender may use
16. For a thorough description of the various stages in the credit evaluation process in
mortgage lending, see RAYMOND T. NIMMER, COMMERCIAL ASSET-BASED FINANCING § 2:02
(1988) (explaining lenders' standard procedure of not making a loan where the probabilities
indicate default).
17. Courts called upon to review a particular lender's creditworthy standards, and
allegedly discriminatory violations under the ECOA, have refused to do so. See, e.g., Gross
v. United States Small Bus. Admin., 669 F. Supp. 50, 52-53, 56 (N.D.N.Y. 1987) (applying
traditional Title VII test to prove credit discrimination and rejecting plaintiffs use of an
alternative test for proving an ECOA violation); Thomas v. First Fed. Savs. Bank of Ind.,
653 F. Supp. 1330, 1340 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (declining to find "disparate impact" under FHA
where plaintiffs evidence of discrimination was statistical disproportion); Miller v. Elegant
Junk, 616 F. Supp. 551, 552-54 (S.D. W. Va. 1985) (granting summary judgment against
credit applicant where applicant's husband was required to sign an application as co-debtor
based on applicant's credit history); Sayers v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 522 F. Supp.
835, 836, 841-42 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (awarding actual and punitive damages for technical
violations of the ECOA, although plaintiff failed to make prima facie case of credit
discrimination); Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026, 1030-32 (N.D. Ga. 1980)
(rejecting plaintiffs ECOA challenge to a lender's use of zip codes as credit predictor
indicator); Carroll v. Exxon Co., 434 F. Supp. 557, 562-63 (E.D. La. 1977) (finding plaintiff
failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ECOA) .
18. 12 C.F.R. § 202.1-202.17 (2005). The ECOA does not impose on lenders a
mandatory procedure for creditworthiness evaluation. Instead, the statute merely removes
certain personal characteristics from the universe of factors that lenders may use to
determine creditworthiness. See Timothy C. Lambert, Fair Marketing: Challenging PreApplication Lending Practices, 87 GEO. L.J. 2181,2196-97,2199 (1999) (arguing that the
ECOA ought to apply to lenders' pre-application targeted solicitation).
19. 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(a) & n.2.
20. See Sarah E. Bums, Note, Credit Scoring and the ECOA: Applying the Effects Test,
88 Yale L.J. 1450, 1453 (1979) (stating that creditors use a two step evaluation process:
first, screening out high-risk applicants who would not be able to or would not repay the
creditor; second, approving applicants determined to fall within the acceptable risk level).
See Winnie F. Taylor, Meeting the Equal Credit Opportunity Act's Specificity Requirement:
Judgmental and Statistical Scoring Systems, 29 BUFF. L. REv. 73,73-74 (1980) (stating that
most creditors choose a system for determining who will obtain credit based on the
applicant's capability and desire to repay the debt).
21. Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,266 (Apr. 29,
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evaluation methods with a disparate impact on minorities if the lender
meets "a legitimate business need that cannot reasonably be achieved as
well by means that are less disparate in their impact.,,22 As explained in the
interpretive comments to Regulation B, creditors are allowed to use criteria
that have a disproportionate impact on minorities as long as there is a
"demonstrable relationship" between the criteria and creditworthiness for
the level of credit involved. 23
The statute gives no guidance to lenders on how to evaluate a
borrower's creditworthiness, or more importantly, how lenders can make
decisions that protect borrowers from being exposed to prohibited
practices. Individuals who sue to enforce fair lending criteria are hampered
by laws that grant lenders broad discretion in establishing creditworthiness.
When injured applicants or borrowers do not sue, or are unsuccessful in
litigation because of the statute's lack of specificity, lenders have less
economic incentive to comply with the statute. The statute, policy, and
regulations are ineffective because lenders are not provided with much
incentive to avoid discrimination when the success of a lawsuit is
minimal. 24 In this regard, the fair lending laws are ineffective as a policing
mechanism for subprime lending violations. 25
1994). The Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending was issued by ten federal
agencies in April 1994. Id. at 18,266-67. It states that "the precise contours of the law on
disparate impact as it applies to lending discrimination are under development." Id. at 18,
269. Efforts to amend the ECOA and FHA to require a higher evidentiary burden in
housing and lending cases failed. The McCollum Amendment was a proposal approved in
1995 by the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services as an amendment to the
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and the Fair
Housing Act. The McCollum Amendment proposed that there be an evidentiary showing of
intentional discrimination in a housing or lending discrimination case. H.R. 1699, 104th
Congo §§ 3(c)(I), (4)(t) (1995).
22. 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(a)(2).
23. Id.
24. See generally Michael Selmi, Subtle Discrimination: A Matter of Perspective
Rather Than Intent, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 657 (2003) (discussing the difficulties of
proving subtle and intentional discrimination).
25. Three statutes should protect borrowers in the marketplace, but have proven to be
ineffective in ameliorating abusive lending. The three statutes are the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2000), the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
of 1994 (HOEPA), amended by 15 U.S.c. §§ 1602(aa), 1639, 1641(d) (2000) (amending
HOEPA), and the Real Estate Settlement Protection Act (RESPA) of 1974, 12 U.S.c. §§
1831b, 2601-2610, 2614-2617 (2000).
HOEPA is triggered when the loan's "annual percentage rate exceeds certain treasury
securities by more than 8% for ftrst lien loans, or if certain points and fees exceed 8% of the
total loan amount." See Elizabeth Renuart, Toward One Competitive and Fair Mortgage
Market: Suggested Reforms in a Tale of Three Markets Point in the Right Direction, 82
TEX. L. REv. 421, 421-22 (2003). Renuart describes the three most signiftcant limitations in
HOEPA as: "(1) it does not in any way limit what the lender can charge as up-front costs to
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B. The ECOA and Structural Inequities
It is unwise to argue that lending is color-blind when lenders' conduct
bespeaks bias and racial animus in identifying lending opportunities. The
economic and financial consequences attendant in lending options reveal
that oftentimes, financial eligibility is based impermissibly on race.
Economists argue that the laws of supply and demand are race neutral
and "work to allocate capital to the highest value user across competing
networks of markets according to competitive and comparative
advantages.,,26 If loans are made in a "color-blind" fashion, neither the
location of the community nor the race of the applicant has a bearing on the
rate of the loan. 27 The market directs capital in ways that will result in
profit maximization. 28
Decades of evidence of disinvestment in urban cities begs a different
condusion. 29 Actually, capital is allocated to communities according to a
the borrower or the amount of such fees that can be financed; (2) the interest rate trigger and
the points and fees trigger in HOEPA are both too high, allowing many abusive lenders to
avoid HOEPA strictures by making high cost loans just under the trigger; and (3) HOEPA
does not apply to open-ended loans." Id. at 422 n.6.
TILA requires lenders to disclose the terms and costs of all loan plans. 15 U.S.c. §
1601(a) (2000). The statute's intent is to compare the cost of borrowing to paying cash, and
compare the costs of borrowing from different lenders. §§ 1601, 1639. To ensure
consumers can do that, the federal government mandates that lenders disclose certain costs
and terms. See Jeff Sovern, Toward a Theory of Warranties in Sales of New Homes:
Housing the Implied Warranty Advocates, Law and Economics Mavens, and Consumer
Psychologists under One Roof, 1993 WIS. L. REv. 13,38-41 (1993) (describing the Truth in
Lending Act as having increased consumer understanding of credit costs, despite its
providing for an overload of information).
RESPA protects consumers from abusive financing costs associated with buying a
home by requiring disclosures about closing costs in advance of settlement. See George S.
Mahaffey Jr., A Product of Compromise: Or Why Non-Pecuniary Damages Should Not Be
Recoverable Under Section 2605 of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 28 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 1,7-8 (2002). Critics argue that the mandated RESPA disclosures occur
too late in the settlement process to allow or encourage comparison shopping. See generally
id.
26. Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Global Markets, Racial Spaces and the Role of Critical Race
Theory in the Struggle for Community Control of Investments: An Institutional Class
Analysis, 45 VILL. L. REv. 1037, 1037 (2000). See also Rachel F. Moran, The Elusive
Nature ofDiscrimination, 55 STAN. L. REv. 2365, 2385 (2003).
27. See Iglesias, supra note 26, at 1037; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Community Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REv. 291, 298-99 (1993).
28. Iglesias, supra note 26, at 1037; Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 296-97.
29. As Professor John A. Powell explains:
What is ignored in [the] cultural analysis of the inner city ... is the explicit role
that the White majority and the government itself have played in creating and
maintaining this racialized space, in creating a society where good neighborhoods
are defined as White neighborhoods and in defining positive individual
characteristics as White characteristics. White flight ... has been fueled by racist
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rather complex interaction of institutional structures that include private
financial institutions and governmental regulations. 3o Access to capital and
investment in communities is dependent on lenders' evaluation of
creditworthiness. 31 Lenders' evaluations are in turn legitimized by the
systemic function of economic theory that ratifies disinvestment. 32
The complexity reveals yet another issue-the role of law in
configuring relations of power and in marginalization of class structures. 33
When it comes to access to loan funds, the supposedly neutral economic
criteria becomes racialized. 34
Understanding how the actual processes affect the financial
transformation of neighborhoods is critical. Policies that fail to address the
inherent, subtle discrimination in the legal rules, norms, procedures, and
institutions effectively deny individuals their economic rights. 35 The
failure to critically examine the existing decision-making structures
produces systems of economic subordination. 36 An alternative scheme
must specifically eliminate the structural and conceptual inequalities that
have created the status quO. 37
fears and facilitated by a host of government policies ....
John A. Powell, The "Racing" of American Society: Race Functioning as a Verb Before
Signifying as a Noun, 15 LAW & INEQ. 99, III (1997).
30. David Scott Black, "Rational" Inner City Disinvestment: A Critique of Lenders'
Negative Economic Rights and a Foucaultian Analysis of Creditworthiness Evaluation, 2
GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 303,304 (1995).
31. Id. at 304-05.
"Segregated minority communities have been historically
impoverished and politically powerless. Today's laws and institutions need not be explicitly
racist to ensure that this state of affairs continues-they need only to perpetuate historical
conditions." Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in
Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1841,1844 (1994).
32. Black, supra note 30, at 304-05; Ford, supra note 31, at 1848.
33. See Deborah Kenn, Institutionalized, Legal Racism: Housing Segregation and
Beyond, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 35, 46-48,69 (2001).
34. Whether the price corresponds to actual gradation in the borrower's riskiness is not
so easily resolved. A non-competitive price may indicate that the predatory lender, which is
sometimes an affiliate of a federally insured financial institution, has been allocated that
particular market share due to the lack of competition in the marketplace.
35. According to Professor Iglesias, "spaces, not per se in the differential access to
legality enjoyed by rich and poor, but rather, in the manner in which law (understood
broadly to include its substantive norms, procedures and institutions) operates in different
ways to allocate differential power among competing groups across many institutional
contexts." Iglesias, supra note 26, at 1040.
36. The ECOA prohibits discrimination based on "race, color, religion, national origin,
sex or marital status, or age." 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(l) (2000). Challenges to banks' credit
decisions are usually unsuccessful. See McCain v. Pennbank, 549 A.2d 1311, 1315 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1988).
37. See Keith Aoki, Race, Space, and Place: The Relation Between Architectural
Modernism, Post-Modernism, Urban Planning, and Gentrification, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
699, 701, 788-90 (1993) (describing white suburban demographics as a politically
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Proponents of human agency argue that structural changes are
unnecessary because the desire for economic freedom is deeply imbedded
within every individua1. 38 Agency proponents argue that the condition of
economic subordination can be transformed by the hard work of
individuals determined to escape poverty?9 The arguments touting
individual agency are akin to entrepreneurial theory, which views selfdetermination and markets free of governmental restraints as crucial to
individual financial transformation. 4o To the proponents of agency theory,
it is regulatory bureaucracy that robs individuals of economic power and
freedom.41 Agency theory requires a solid system of empowering contract
and property rights in which individuals compete in the marketplace.
Under agency theory, the individual trying to combat predatory
lending must be well-versed on the intricacies of mortgage financing. The
individual also must be effective in detecting and policing the lenders'
decision-making process. Unfortunately, few individuals have either the
know-how or the wherewithal to accomplish this.42 Even fewer will be
successful, given the studies showing systemic discrimination in mortgage
lending. 43 One of the numerous results of hypersegregation is that it is
vastly more difficult for racial and ethnic minorities to mount a defense to
the posited business justifications.44
independent suburban "municipal sovereignty" that uses zoning powers to maintain
residential segregation).
38. See generally Reginald Leamon Robinson, Human Agency, Negated Subjectivity,
and White Structural Oppression: An Analysis of Critical Race Practice/Praxis, 53 AM. U.
L. REV. 1361 (2004).
39. Professor Reginald Robinson challenges race consciousness to the extent that it
does not require that an individual exercise personal responsibility. Id. at 1366-68, 1408.
40. See Audrey G. McFarlane, When Inclusion Leads to Exclusion: The Uncharted
Terrain of Community Participation in Economic Development, 66 BROOK. L. REv. 861,
876-77, 880 (2001) (arguing that empowerment zones are a flawed answer to community
development woes).
41. See, e.g., Toby Egan, Critical Race Theory's Individual Flaw, 67 U. Mo. KAN.
CITY L. REv. 661, 692-93 (1999).
42. See generally Mansfield, supra note 3.
43. See RISK OR RACE?, supra note 5, at 87-106 (reviewing statistical data of subprime
lending patterns in the mortgage refinance market for the 331 metropolitan statistical areas
in the United States).
44. Plaintiffs bringing a lending discrimination case are disadvantaged by the absence
of a single standard among the federal circuit courts. Plaintiffs are dependent upon the
courts' interpretation of the various evidentiary approaches, among them the burdenshifting, four-factor, and statistical approaches, and the various modifications depending on
whether the parties are public or private. Those interpretations have been unclear and have
generated concern about the appropriate standards that apply and plaintiffs' evidentiary
burdens. Specifically, it is unclear under the ECOA whether evidence of a disparate impact,
without evidence of an intent to discriminate, is sufficient to establish a violation; whether
there should be a statutorily-imposed or court-imposed finding of discriminatory intent; and
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Agency does not represent choice for individuals who are powerless.
What it does represent is a perpetual marginality.45 Contrary to notions of
agency, individuals have little power to make sustaining transformations
when the underlying structure is flawed. Community action has been
instrumental in blocking mergers of banking institutions that failed to be
accountable to neighborhoods. 46
Sustainable change to those
neighborhoods requires usurping the legal construction of powerful
institutions and understanding how the institutional arrangements produce
structural inequities.47
The denial of economic rights creates racial spaces when policies fail
to address the inherent, subtle discrimination in legal rules, norms,
procedures, and institutions. 48 Understanding how these inequities have
evolved with the support of the law requires identifying economic
relationships. This inquiry begins with an examination of the economic
ordering. Focusing on disinvestment, banks and mortgage companies
operating in the private sphere are as culpable as government policies in
perpetuating borrower inequities. Hierarchical decision-making results in
policies and laws that exclude the group of persons who are powerless to
oppose those laws and policies that are not in their best interests.
Subprime lending uses lending criteria that creates racialized space.
In this context, racialized space refers to neutral rules that are applied in a
race-conscious manner. 49 Lenders engage in "reverse" credit allocation by
making subprime loans abundantly available while making access to prime
loans unavailable. 50 There is little justification, other than the profits and
fees the subprime loan will generate, for making a subprime loan to a
borrower who otherwise qualifies for a primary loan. 51 Often, there is a
lack of documentation and rationale as to why a borrower is given a riskwhat standard of proof a defendant must satisfy to rebut a plaintiff's prima facie case of
illegal lending discrimination based on disparate impact.
45. Iglesias, supra note 26, at 1042-43,1051-52.
46. Christopher A. Richardson, The Community Reinvestment Act and the Economics
oj Regulatory Policy, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1607 & n.74, 1627-28 (2002).
47. See Ford, supra note 31, at 1845. Chief among these institution of powers that
must be usurped regarding subprime lending are the arrangements between federally insured
institutions and their affiliates which allow the affiliates to export interest rates and to
shuffle the subprime and predatory loans to these non-regulated subsidiaries. See generally
Cassandra Jones Havard, To Lend or Not to Lend: What the CRA Ought to Say About
Subprime and Predatory Lending, 7 FL. COASTAL L. REv. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Jones
Havard, To Lend or Not to Lend].
48. See Aoki, supra note 37, at 788; Iglesias, supra note 26, at 1040.
49. See Iglesias, supra note 26, at 1037-38.
50. See Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle: A Case jor States as
Laboratories ojExperimentation, 57 FLA. L. REv. 295, 330-32 (2005).
51. Id. at 304-07, 330-32.
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adjusted loan product. Instead, lenders are encouraged implicitly to make
biased decisions about creditworthiness rather than decisions based on
well-defined, rational sounds. The transparency of race becomes evident in
this and many other contexts.
Although mortgage lending is subject to the ECOA, mortgage
companies can hide many of their decisions. 52 The discrimination and
compliance statutes create some accountability, but are unable to measure
the indirect slights or unwillingness to share critical information. It is often
the discretionary decision-making (for example, which loan product to
offer to a client initially, or how much assistance to provide) that will make
a client look more creditworthy. Within the subprime lending process, the
structure should require the loan officer, the mortgage broker, or any
number of persons who originate loans to make the process one that is fair,
that invites informed decision-making, and that systemically operates to
match the best product to the individual borrower.
This kind of
accountability is missing in legitimate risk-based lending. Reforms that
encourage transparency, require disclosure, and place responsibility on the
originating lender when appropriate should be the foundations of an
economically efficient, risk-based pricing regime. To allow geographical
boundaries to create and give license to an economic structure is to allow
race to impact the market economy.
The democratization of economic power requires a demonstration that
the affairs and interests of those who are politically vulnerable are
protected. Otherwise, institutionalized powerless people are pushed to the
economic margins and eventually become defenseless.
II.

MARKET STRUCTURE AS EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT

The deregulation of the financial services industry and advances in
technology have changed the way financial firms market products to their
customers. Historically, mortgage interest rates were regulated by the
states, not by the federal government. 53 In 1979, the deregulation of
deposit interest rates occurred because savings and loan institutions were

52. See Stephen M. Dane, Eliminating the Labyrinth: A Proposal to SimplifY Federal
Mortgage Lending Discrimination Laws, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 527, 548 (1993)
(critiquing ECOA's limitations as ineffective because the statute is inapplicable to other
significant participants not involved in the loan origination decision, "such as appraisers,
homeowners, mortgage insurers, and secondary market participants").
53. The first federal mortgage rate regulations were in the Federal Home Loan Bank
Act, 12 U.S.c. §§ 1421-1449 (2000), which set a federal usury limit, only ifthere were no
applicable state usury limits. Mansfield, supra note 3, at 477-78.
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unable to maintain profitable loan portfolios. 54 The fierce competition for
customers in an era of record-high interest rates narrowed the profit
margins of thrifts so that many began to lose their customer base to money
market funds that were not so restricted. 55 The domino effect meant that
savings and loans, with less funds on deposit, also had less funds available
for mortgage loans. 56 The statute allowed savings and loans to earn more
income by "allowing them to charge whatever interest they could on firstlien home mortgages,,,57 and to establish interest-bearing checking
accounts. 58
Specifically, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act (DIDMCA) preempted state usury ceilings for first-lien
mortgages. 59 It required states to opt out of the mortgage preemption
provision through specific state action within three years. 60 As a result of
these federal statutes, subprime lenders "charge unlimited interest rates on
nonpurchase money loans secured by the borrower's residence - regardless
of the purpose for which the loan was made.,,61
Service markets have also changed with deregulation. Mortgages are
no longer geographically confined. 62
Deregulation has created
compatibility between economic policies and incompatible social policies.
Provided that "the lender secures a first-lien position on the consumer's
residential real estate," nothing presently "regulates the maximum interest
rate for loans such as debt consolidation loans, home improvement loans,
refinance loans, and loans made for the purpose of obtaining consumer

54. Although market interest rates were in the double digits, state interest rate ceilings
required lenders to make mortgage loans far below the prevailing market rates. Savings and
loans made up to sixty percent of all mortgage loans until 1979. See 125 CONGo REc. 29,930
(1979) (statement of Sen. Morgan); Mansfield, supra note 3, at 494-95.
55. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) of
1980 §§ 511-512, Pub L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.), amended by Pub. L. No. 96-399, § 324(b), 94 Stat. 1614, 1648
(1980); Mansfield, supra note 3, at 497-98.
56. Mansfield, supra note 3, at 498.
57. Id. at 499.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 476, 493-94.
60. DIDMCA § 501(b)(2), 94 Stat. at 162. Congress also passed the Alternative
Mortgage Transaction Parity Act (AMTPA) of 1982, 12 U.S.C. § 3803(c) (2000)
(preempting state statutes from restricting the use of alternative mortgage transactions, such
as variable rate loans, balloon payments, and negative amortizations). See also Mansfield,
supra note 3, at 508-09.
61. Mansfield, supra note 3, at 542.
62. See generally Michael H. Schill, The Impact oj the Capital Markets on Real Estate
Law and Practice, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 269 (1999).
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,,63 The security of the home investment is now mired with
goods
consumer debt. 64
Deregulation has fostered exclusionary conduct.
Exclusionary
conduct does not refer to activities that are per se regulated under, or
prohibited by, antitrust laws for impairing rival opportunities. However, it
is necessary to analyze whether the operation of the mortgage markets, post
deregulation, has impaired consumers by unnecessarily restricting rivals on
some basis other than efficiency.65 The structural inequity of subprime
lending becomes more apparent after such analysis. When viewed from the
consumer's perspective, it is a disadvantageous congruence of market
dominance, segmentation, and securitization.
Market dominance occurs because there is a lack of competition
among subprime lenders. 66 Admittedly, the federal regulation of financial
institutions narrows the lending opportunities that banks and thrifts can
make to non-prime borrowers. 67 Yet, borrowers who perceive themselves
as not having many options have asymmetric information regarding
available lending opportunities and limit their choices. Subprime lenders
offer opportunities to these borrowers who may have unnecessarily avoided
the prime market.
Similarly, market segmentation is an outgrowth of market dominance.
When lenders segment markets, the underlying presumption is that it is
economically efficient to offer homogenous products to homogeneous
markets. Again, borrower perception is key, because an uninformed
borrower does not understand the value of initiating and exercising more
choice.
A third market phenomenon is the securitization and sale of
mortgages on the secondary market. The process of securitization
indirectly shifts fair lending responsibility away from the primary lender
who sells loans on the secondary market. 68 Recent statistical evidence
indicating disparate impact treatment in loans eligible for sale on the

63. Mansfield, supra note 3, at 542.
64. See generally Julia Patterson Forrester, Constructing a New Theoretical
Frameworkfor Home Improvement Financing, 75 OR. L. REv. 1095 (1996).
65. See Patrick Bolton et aI., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88
GEO. L.J. 2239, 2242-43, 2268-69 (2000).
66. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law
and Economics ofPredatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1255, 1297-98 (2002).
67. See generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The acc's Preemption Rules Exceed the
Agency's Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and
Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 225 (2004).
68. See Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and
the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REv. 503, 550-51 (2002).
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secondary market underscores the unfavorable treatment of minorities by
the secondary market. 69 Unbeknownst to most borrowers, negotiation of
mortgages, which may include sale on the secondary market, encourages
deceit by lenders who are able to cut off borrowers' claims of fraud and
misrepresentation through the sale. 7o
These three practices affect access to credit and control over the
distribution of capital. They hamper a borrower's ability to receive a
product that is accurately priced for risk, is properly underwritten, and
adequately reflects the borrower's ability to repay. Failure to account for
and address the control that these phenomena have over the mortgage
market further evidences how structural inequities rob individuals of
economic choice.
A. MARKET DOMINANCE

Describing the landscape of predatory lending in terms of an antitrust
principle of high-cost predatory and opportunistic pricing provides a basis
for examining the impact of the banking regulatory structure on the
competitiveness of the subprime market. The antitrust rules provide the
backdrop for explaining the conduct that prime and subprime lenders use to
segment customers and charge them exorbitant prices. The conflicting
values of the lender and the borrower mask a deeper issue: the inability or
unwillingness of the lender to make available the fairest and most
economically efficient loan terms given the borrower's particular
situation. 7 ! Although these practices are not a violation of antitrust
principles, they provide a basis for understanding how predatory
69. Id. at 551. HVD established an in-house team to review years of data for evidence
of discrimination on the part of the Government Sponsored Enterprises. See Kathleen Day,
HUD Says Mortgage Policies Hurt Blacks. WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2000, at AI. The data
represents mortgages for loans of$227,150 or less. Jd.
Mortgages to:
Total Market
Fannie Mae
Freddie Mac

Minorities
15.3%
14.0%
12.2%

Blacks Hispanics
5.2%
5.0%
4.9%
3.2%
4.4%
3.0%

Asians
3.6%
5.9%
4.8%

Id. Fannie Mae challenged the accuracy of the data used in the article, contending that it did
not include approximately 250,000 mortgages purchased with no racial identification. See
Franklin Raines, Fannie Mae's Credit History, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2000, at A21.
70. See Eggert. supra note 68, at 520, 607-08.
71. This may be due in part to the use of mortgage brokers, who recommend loans to
borrowers. See Siddhartha Venkatesan, Abrogating the Holder in Due Course Doctrine in
Subprime Mortgage Transactions to More Effectively Police Predatory Lending, 7 N.Y.V. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'y 177, 185 (2003) (noting that the lack of fiduciary duty encourages
mortgage brokers to recommend subprime and predatory loans to borrowers).
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monopolization and capture of minority, low-income, and distressed
markets is a legitimate concern.
The classic definition of predatory pricing calls for a sacrifice of profit
in the short run for the purpose of driving competitors from the market. 72
The predator expects that competitors will exit the market, thereafter
enabling the predator firm to raise prices and earn monopoly or
"supracompetitive" profits. 73 While the predatory tactics may vary, belowcost pricing operates through some device that results in loss to the riva1. 74
What must be shown is that the dominant firm's conduct has affected the
existence of some market power, making the rival's entry into the market
more difficult and costly, to the detriment of competition generally.75
Predatory lending is not a typical predatory tactic, so predatory
lending cases do not fit squarely within the analytical framework for
predatory pricing violations. Predatory lending is similar to predatory
pricing in that it is a cost-effective tactic allowing the lender to challenge
and dominate a market underserved by traditional financial institutions to
the disadvantage of the borrower. If it can be shown that the predatory
lender does not engage in accurate risk-based pricing, then arguably the
cost, or price of the loan, is not properly set. The predatory lender, because
of the traditional lender's exclusion of certain demographic markets and
geographical areas, becomes dominant in the market because the predatory
lender is the only source of loan funds. The predatory lender does not have
to mount a broad market challenge because of the lack of competition for
this particular market.
The "rival" is a fair lender, sometimes a federally insured financial
institution, that would accurately price the loan. The predatory lender's
dominance is not born of aggressiveness in trying to eliminate other lenders
as much as it is born of a market that is non-responsive to both the
predatory borrower and to the neighborhood in which the property is
located. Regulatory restrictions control the ability of the federally insured
financial institution to make loans to some subprime borrowers. 76 While
these regulations may not specifically prohibit subprime lending, the
federally insured financial institution may be unwilling to design the
products that will provide the subprime borrower with access to lower cost
72. Bolton et ai., supra note 65, at 2242-43.
73. Id. at 2322, 2256, 2269.
74. Id. at 2267-69.
75. Id. at 2255-56, 2267-69.
76. Dan Niedzwiecki, Note, The Massachusetts High Cost Home Loan Regulations: Is
This the End of Predatory Lending in the Commonwealth? 21 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 335,
341 (2002).
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loan funds. 77 Moreover, historically, many federally insured financial
institutions have put little effort into, and thus have had poor results in,
lending in these economically distressed areas. 78
In some instances, the identified "rival" is a cohort, not a competitor.
Some subprime predation is arguably government subsidized. Subprime
lenders finance their operations by borrowing funds at a favorable rate from
federally insured financial institutions?9 These lenders in tum sell the loan
funds at a profit to the borrower, at a lower price than the traditional
lender. 80 As a result, there is the classic predation model of selling a
product for a low price to gain a dominant position.
There is real competition for the subprime borrower. The federally
insured financial institution, if willing to offer credit to the subprime
borrower, would calculate a higher cost for the credit to compensate for the
presumably higher monitoring costs, including regulatory costs, that would
accompany the loan. 8 ! To the extent that the non-federally insured
subprime lender reduces the price of the costs of the loan, the federally
insured financial institution is driven out of the market. The subprime
lender's access to lower cost funds from the federally insured institution
allows the lender to gain dominance in the market because of the lender's
ability to price the loan below the product's competitive cost level. Yet,
subprime borrowers, in effect upon default, pay the same higher price that
could have been avoided if legitimate competition had in fact been present.
Market dominance alone would be injurious to subprime borrowers, but
when joined with market segmentation, it is ruinous.
B. Market Segmentation

More recently, business organizations, including financial institutions,
are creating plans that will capture independent segments of a market. This
type of sorting can be made according to a customer's willingness to pay
certain amounts for products. 82 Or as argued below, market segmentation
77. Id. at 337-38; see JAMES H. CARR & JENNY SCHUETZ, FANNIE MAE FOUND.,
FINANCIAL SERVICES IN DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES: FRAMING THE ISSUE, FINDING SOLUTIONS
18 (2001) (discussing that the innovative partnerships that banks and fringe lenders can
engage in stem the high costs of subprime lending).
78. See generally Christopher A. Richardson, The Community Reinvestment Act and
the Economics ofRegulatory Policy, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1607 (2002).
79. Niedzwiecki, supra note 76, at 341-42.
80. Id. at 339-41.
81. Id.
82. Financial institutions can realize substantial profits when markets are carefully
segmented. See Harry C. Katz, Industry Studies of Wage Inequality, 54 INDus. & LAB. REL.
REv. 399, 399-400 (2001).
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may be based on impennissible criteria. 83 The sorting also leads to market
dominance as a phenomenon of the deregulation of mortgage markets.
Savings and loans and banks are no longer the dominant lenders in
mortgage markets. Efforts to get around the regulations imposed on
financial institutions led banks to partner with more loosely regulated
mortgage companies. 84 These affiliations are often unknown to customers
who may be steered into a more costly loan product. 85 This may be
especially true in minority and low and moderate-income markets where
the markets have been historically plagued with concentrations of imperfect
infonnation. 86 The failure of lenders to invest more in evaluating the
standards of creditworthiness often results in credit denial for fear of lack
of profitability.
Businesses find it more efficient to sort the customer base by
similarities such as customer income, product interests and preferences, and
age. 87 By creating customer sets and subsets, implicit comparisons are
made about customer preferences. Customer segmentation leads to more
homogeneous markets. 88 Homogeneous markets can lead to targeting. 89 In
matching customer demand to product offerings, there is arguably a more
efficient delivery of services. 9o A differentiated market strategy for each
homogeneous base dictates the characteristics of the service or product that
a financial institution offers given the customer's preferences or

83. Market segmentation may not be illegal, but it becomes suspect when based on
impermissible criteria. See generally Ross D. Petty et aI., Regulating Target Marketing and
Other Race-Based Advertising Practices, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 335 (2003) (discussing racebased advertising practices).
84. Niedzwicki, supra note 76, at 341-42.
85. [d. at 342-45.
86. Petty et aI., supra note 83, at 379-80.
87. [d. at 343. Market segmentation allows service providers to match customer
demand to product offerings. The homogeneity of the market makes it more efficient and
allows providers to group individuals according to demand characteristics. [d. at 342 n.29.
Firms can also engage in "strategic" segmentation, which results in further customization
and tailoring of preferences or quality. PHILIP KOTLER, MARKETING MANAGEMENT 264 (8th
ed. 1994).
88. See Petty et aI., supra note 83, at 342 n.29; Paul N. Bloom & William D. Novelli,
Problems and Challenges in Social Marketing, 45 J. MARKETING 79, 81 (1981). Developing
a target market requires dividing buyers into discrete categories. KOTLER, supra note 87, at
264. Homogeneous segments for mortgages might include (I) age, income, and religious
preference; (2) housing condition; (3) geographic location; and (4) ethnicity. Lambert,
supra note 18, at 2190-92.
89. See Bloom & Novelli, supra note 88, at 81; Petty et aI., supra note 83, at 342 n.29.
Market segmentation may be a form of discrimination when illegal demographic factors are
used to determine which customers are solicited to receive the most favorable credit card
and loan offers. Lambert, supra note 18, at 2184,2203.
90. Lambert, supra note 18, at 2218.
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willingness to pay for the offerings. 91 Creators of segmentation strategies
would argue, therefore, that customer demand and product offerings can be
more accurately met.
Authentic market segmentation should be distinguished from artificial
market segmentation or market steering. 92 Grouping a customer base
according to decided preferences should not be confused with denying a
group of customers access to products based on demographic categories,
including race and ethnicity. Instead of offering the product that best fits
the borrower's needs, the borrower is offered the product that is the most
profitable based on race or neighborhood demographics. 93
Informational deficiencies are inherent within subprime lending. 94 An
assumption of efficient markets is that lenders have perfect information on
which to base credit decisions. When this information is insufficient or
missing, lenders must incur information costs to determine the borrower's
ability and willingness to re-pay the obligation. 95 Based on profit
projections of loan performance, lenders determine the risk adverse
selection effect and moral hazard effect ofborrowers. 96
A closer evaluation of creditworthiness standards reveals that
although important, their importance has been misplaced. Using their
predictive value to bridge the informational deficiencies requires
recognizing the inherent bias in the creditworthiness evaluation as it relates
to minorities. 97

91. Id. at 2186-87.
92. C. Edwin Baker, The Media That Citizens Need, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 317, 374-80
(1998) (using the media to make distinctions between authentic and corrupt market
segmentation).
93. Taiesha L. Cantwell, Yield-Spread Premiums: Who's Working for the Borrower?
HUD's Erroneous Regulation and its Bar on Plaintiffs, 21 LAW & INEQ. 367, 375 (2003).
See generally Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race
Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757 (2003) (reviewing CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW
CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002), which discusses homogeneity
in the employment context).
94. Michael S. Barr, Credit Where it Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and
its Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 513, 534-35 (2005).
95. Immigrant and minority populations are especially vulnerable to information
asymmetries. See Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Can New Americans Achieve the American
Dream? Promoting Homeownership in Immigrant Communities, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 169, 172-73, 177-78 (2004).
96. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial
Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States, 48 STAN.
L. REv. 73, 90 (1995).
97. Fred Galves, The Discriminatory Impact of Traditional Lending Criteria: An
Economic and Moral Critique, 29 SETON HALL L. REv. 1467, 1473 (1999); Barr, supra note
94, at 534-35.
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1. Perfect Information

Borrowers have infonnation superior to that of banks concerning the
borrower's ability to perfonn. 98 This handicaps banks because they cannot
predict the borrower's future perfonnance. 99 To compensate for the
infonnation deficit, financial institutions use interest rates as a screening
mechanism. Higher interest rates will yield more income from successful
projects on the possibility that the borrower will default and not repay the
obligation. loo The notion that credit criteria can detennine who is a risky
borrower may be flawed. lOl The underlying presumption of credit criteria
is that past conduct is an accurate predictor of a borrower's future
perfonnance. 102 .
Instead of charging higher interest rates to borrowers who would
otherwise be denied credit, financial institutions simply choose not to
extend credit to these "risky" borrowers. Credit rationing thus creates a
gap in the market for credit. I 03 The subprime lender counters the lack of
infonnation that causes adverse selection by imposing oppressive tenns
upon default. I 04 The adverse selection phenomenon means that some
lenders are willing to take on more risk while the risk adverse selection
effect identifies the borrower who is the most at risk. lOS Correspondingly,
the adverse selection borrower is one who is willing to pay a higher rate of
interest because she expects the profits to increase with the risk.l06
Lenders who have limited credit opportunities regulate credit by screening
out the borrowers who are willing to pay a higher interest rate for credit. 107
The subprime lender has an incentive to identify the borrower who
will engage in risky repayment behavior. While the traditional model is for
the lender to view the moral hazard effect as a negative, the subprime
lender views it as positive. I 08 The moral hazard effect evaluates the

98. Macey & Miller, supra note 96, at 90.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 77-81.
101. Id. at 90-91.
102. Galves, supra note 97, at 1473.
103. Barr, supra note 94, at 537-38.
104. Id.
105. !d.
106. Id.; Daniel S. Ehrenberg, If the Loan Doesn't Fit, Don't Take It: Applying the
Suitability Doctrine to the Mortgage Industry to Eliminate Predatory Lending, 10 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITYDEV. L. 117, 119-20 (2001).
107. Frank Lopez, Using the Fair Housing Act to Combat Predatory Lending, 6 GEO.
J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'y 73, 77 (1999) (describing the credit shortage as one of reverse
redlining in credit-starved communities that have been shut out by traditional lenders).
108. Barr, supra note 94, at 536-38.
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likelihood that the borrower will repay the loan once made. 109 The lender
evaluates the project's potential for success and lends to the borrower at a
higher rate of interest to protect against default.
Far too often, the marketing strategies of subprime lenders make no
attempt to bridge information deficiencies. llo Instead of instituting
screening and monitoring mechanisms, subprime lenders base offers of
interest rates and loan terms on race and geography. I I I There is little
incentive to make adequate disclosures or present alternatives about riskbased products when the originating lender is able to sell the loans quickly
on the secondary market. 112 While some may argue that regulating
subprime lending will restrict credit opportunities for the less-than-prime
borrower, it is important to require that those lenders engage in adequate
screening and monitoring activities and are not unnecessarily passing along
asymmetric information costs to borrowers.
The subprime lender views the information deficiency as an
opportunity to make a more substantial profit. Knowing that the borrower
is willing to pay a higher rate of interest for the loan, the subprime lender is
not dissuaded by its lack of information. These lenders in fact thrive on
limited information about borrowers to justify the high rates that they
charge. 113 Indeed, there is little incentive for the lender to become privy to
more information about the borrower and thus adjust either the amount of
credit or the rate of interest. I 14 Having identified these borrowers as riskadverse and recognizing a benefit in foreclosure of the residential property,
lenders benefit if the size of the loan is larger. I 15 This leads the borrower
to conclude that the loan is rational, when, in fact, it may not be.
2. Transaction Costs

Efforts for a borrower to secure her own financing are costly.
Transaction costs affect the economic efficiency of a deal between the
lender and the borrower.
Transaction costs measure the costs of
performance. 116 Transaction costs often interfere with credit availability as
109. See Charles G. Hallinan, The 'Fresh Start' Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A
Historical Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REv. 49, 83-84 (1986);
Barr, supra note 94, at 538.
110. Engel & McCoy, supra note 66, at 1286.
Ill. Id.
112. Id. at 1286-87.
113. Barr, supra note 94, at 535-36.
114. Id. at 535-37.
115. Margot Saunders, The Increase in Predatory Lending and Appropriate Remedial
Actions, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. Ill, 119-20 (2002).
116. See Manuel A. Utset, Producing Information: Initial Public Offerings, Production
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they can price a borrower out of the market because verifying borrower
information and negotiating funds' availability with investors are costly
functions. 117 In the most efficient bargains, the parties negotiate on who
will bear these costs. 118
The lender's job as a financial intermediary is to diversify risk,
evaluate investments, and provide liquidity to the investors. I 19 The lender
must charge the borrower for the costs of acquiring and verifying
information, as well as for the cost of searching for the funding of the
loan. 120 The lender incurs the costs of identifying the investor who will
finance the transaction and the borrower who needs the funds. The
participation of the secondary market makes the subprime lender more like
a financial intermediary that incurs costs for negotiating and verifying
contracts.
Borrowers must pay the lender for finding an investor. In general,
borrowers are unable to identify investors who are willing to take on the
risk of funding an illiquid asset that spans fifteen to thirty years. The
lender serves as an intermediary who must match the investor with the
borrower's needs. Similarly, an intermediary's transaction costs will be
less than those that an individual borrower may incur if she were to seek
her own investors. 121
The advantage of the subprime lender is that the subprime loans will
be sold quickly on the secondary market. This substantially reduces the
transaction costs of finding funding. In the context of subprime lending,
the existence of the secondary market has a direct effect on transaction
costS.1 22 The secondary market substantially reduces the search costs for
the average lender. As a readily identifiable source of funds, the secondary
market creates liquidity in these assets. Conversely, the borrower who is
trying to secure financing independent of traditional lenders will find
Costs, and the Producing Lawyer, 74 OR. L. REv. 275, 288-89 (1995).
117. See Barr, supra note 94, at 536-37.
118. See generally Scott R. Peppet, Contract Formation in Imperfect Markets: Should
We Use Mediators in Deals?, 38 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. REsoL. 283 (2004).
119. See Jeffrey S. Glaser, The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Risk Valuation, Judicial
Interpretation, and Market Bias, 50 Bus. LAW. 687, 689-90 (1995) (discussing efficient
portfolio diversification). .
120. See Michael I. Swygert & Katherine Earle Yanes, A Unified Theory of Justice:
The Integration of Fairness into Efficiency, 73 WASH. L. REv. 249, 272-74 (1998)
(discussing the "ad hoc" and "definitional" approaches to transaction costs).
121. Mortgage borrowers are less disadvantaged in the credit economy than other types
of borrowers because there is a ready source of funds for residential mortgages. Ann M.
Burkhart, Lenders and Land, 64 Mo. L. REv. 249, 278 (1999).
122. See generally Venkatesan, supra note 71 (comparing the transaction costs of the
holder in due course doctrine with the borrower's right to recover from an assignee).

254

Syracuse Law Review

[Vol. 56:233

borrowing funds to be too costly.
3. Agency Costs

The agency costs, or the costs of managing the loan after the borrower
receives the funds, also bear some significance to the lender's decisions of
whether to make the loan and how to price it. Agency costs represent the
lender's ability to assess the borrower's credit managerial skills. 123 A
lender must evaluate the borrower's incentive to repay the loan and to
engage in conduct or behavior that will maximize the benefits of the loan as
well as refraining from conduct that will retard the loan's efficiency.124
Basically, an agency cost is an assessment of the borrower's ability to
repay.125 The lender evaluates the borrower's credibility in promising to
repay the debt by evaluating the borrower's present earnings, predicting
future income streams, and reviewing past credit history.126 Securitization
allows the originating lender to avoid a critical evaluation of agency costs.
The need to accurately predict the borrower's ability to perform
cannot be ignored. Far too often in subprime lending, the equity in the
home and the availability of foreclosure are used as a proxy for this
assessment. Instead of an adequate assessment of whether the borrower
will conform her behavior to make the transaction a profit-maximizing one,
subprime lenders wager on the borrower's equity. Thus, if the borrower
fails to perform as expected, she loses by giving up the right of home
ownership. The subprime lender has simplistically and inappropriately
characterized many borrowers as high-risk. The subprime lender also
predetermines that the subprime borrower will be an unreliable agent in
monitoring, adjusting when necessary, and conforming to the terms of the
loan.
The notion of agency becomes confused with free choice in subprime
lending. 127 Assuming borrowers have neither accurate nor adequate
information about their level of risk, they cannot be said to have acted
rationally or with free choice in accepting a loan that was not in their best
interests. Accepting an overpriced loan that can become onerous with any
123. See James W. Lovely, Agency Costs, Liquidity, and the Limited Liability
Company as an Alternative to the Close Corporation, 21 STETSON L. REv. 377, 379 n.9
(1992).
124. The lender needs to have the ability to minimize the borrower's moral hazard.
Larry T. Garvin, Credit, Information, and Trust in the Law of Sales: The Credit Seller's
Right ofReclamation, 44 UCLA L. REv. 247, 286-87, 341 (1996).
125. Id. at 309.
126. See Galves, supra note 97, at 1476 (arguing that employment stability is biased
and is "really just a proxy for income stability").
127. See discussion supra Part LB.
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financial mistake or mishap cannot be equated with agency costs that
justify a higher loan price. The offered product was flawed from the
beginning. The effect of securitization cannot be overstated. The ability of
the lender to sell the loan on the secondary market also permits the lender
to short-circuit an evaluation of agency, or the borrower's ability to manage
the loan, which would otherwise be critical. The inquiry should be whether
the borrower has an ability to repay with sufficient residual income. 128
Furthermore, if the subprime lender is required to look at alternative
behavior, there are proxies that indicate the borrower's ability to manage
the debt. If the lender's only behavior proxy is credit history as reported
through the credit bureaus, the information may not be the most reliable
and may result in unnecessarily high agency costs added to the price of the
loan.
C. Government-Sponsored Entities (GSEs)-The Secondary Loan Market

The secondary mortgage market provides money to originate
mortgages by purchasing primary mortgages after origination. 129 Unlike
the primary market, which has direct contact with individual borrowers,
secondary market participants have an indirect relationship with the
borrower. 130 Secondary market entities include government-sponsored
agencies as well as depository institutions, mortgage companies, pension
funds, and real estate investment trusts.
Secondary market institutions play a critical role in the residential
lending market, and either support or exasperate the negative market
segmentation and specialization that exists in the primary mortgage market.
Recognizing the potential for discrimination that exists due to the
purchasing and securitization activities that occur in secondary market
institutions, Congress amended the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
("HMDA").
The choice to live in an ethnically homogeneous
neighborhood usually results in a decline in municipal services. J3J For
128. See Cassandra Jones Havard, Invisible Markets Netting Visible Results: When
Subprime Lending Becomes Predatory, 26 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 1057, 1076 (2001)
(discussing the importance of taking residual into account income).
129. See generally Edward L. Pittman, Economic and Regulatory Developments
Affecting Mortgage Related Securities, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 497, 501-02 (1989).
130. See Ronald K. Schuster, Lending Discrimination: Is the Secondary Market
Helping to Make the "American Dream" a Reality?, 36 GONZ. L. REv. 153, 156,175-76

(2000-2001).
131. See Franklin D. Wilson & Roger B. Hammer, Ethnic Residential Segregation and
Its Consequences, in URBAN INEQUALITY: EVIDENCE FROM FOUR CITIES 272, 273, 294 (Alice
O'Connor et at. eds., 2001) (discussing that minorities pay a price for living in ethnically
homogeneous neighborhoods).
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example, such neighborhoods have fewer recreational areas (such as parks),
less police protection, higher vandalism, poorer quality schools, and a
"limited availability of retail and financial establishments.,,132
Regulations require mortgage lenders to disclose information on the
race, income, and other characteristics of loan applicants. 133 However,
each secondary market institution specifies the underlying criteria that
loans must meet to be eligible for purchase or securitization by that
entity.134 Those variables, which include loan limits and underlying
guidelines, affect the type and size of loans that the secondary market
institutions will buy or securitize. 135 In this regard, the secondary market's
inherent structural biases can go largely undetected and its discriminatory
effects unpoliced. 136 An evaluation of GSEs' underlying criteria raises
questions of whether secondary market GSEs can more fully promote "the
availability of mortgage credit to low- and moderate-income
households.',137 The question becomes what is the appropriate monitoring
device to determine whether the secondary agencies are adequately
promoting the availability of mortgage credit to low- and moderate-income
minority households.
1. Background

The deregulation of the banking industry has changed the way in
which mortgages are originated and what happens to them after origination.
When Congress passed the Depository Institutions Monetary Control Act
("DIMCA"), the immediate response was an increased competItion for
deposits. Banks traditionally relied on deposits to raise capital. The
competition for deposit dollars became fierce as capital-starved banks
touted a "win big-lose nothing" attitude, knowing that if they failed their
deposits were insured by the federal deposit insurance fund. The high
interest rates for borrowing money that outpaced the performance of loans
held in portfolio were especially disastrous to the traditional savings and

132. [d. at 273.
133. Schuster, supra note 130, at 161 (discussing the HMDA requirement that lending
institutions publicly disclose loan information and applicant characteristics).
134. Give current Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac guidelines and loan-limit sizes.
(Effective 111105, limit size is $359, 650)
135. See Schuster, supra note 130, at 156-58.
136. /d. at 179 (discussing the secondary market's "ability to discriminate outside the
scope of the legislative barriers").
137. Glenn B. Canner & Stuart A. Gabriel, Market Segmentation and Lender
Specialization in the Primary and Secondary Mortgage Markets, 3 HOUSING POL'y DEBATE
241,295 (1992).
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loan. 138
The deregulation of the financial services industry also bolstered the
modern secondary mortgage market by making the mortgage-backed
security a routine way of financing the common home mortgage loan. 139
The mortgage-backed security requires mortgage originators to cater their
lending to the loan's liquidity and the ability to sell the loan on the
secondary market. 140 The result is a dynamic change in the once local
mortgage real estate market. Investors dictate that the products of this
market be UfIiform and predictable. Moreover, the market structure has
evolved into various participants with each investing in only a discrete
portion of the cash flow of the loan. Each set of investors has different
expectations and risk tolerances, and thus, a different expected outcome.
These differences are in some respects magnified when the loan fails and
the divergent interests of the investors become competitive. Regulatory
changes to the secondary mortgage market must be made with an
understanding of these investor demands to avoid hampering the market's
efficiency. 141

2. Market Liquidity
Congress created the GSEs to ensure that home buyers throughout the
COUfltry have available mortgage funds. 142 The secondary mortgage
138. See generally Cassandra Jones Havard, Back to the Parent: Holding Company
Liability for Subsidiary Banks-A Discussion of the Net Worth Maintenance Agreement, the
Source of Strength Doctrine, and the Prompt Corrective Action Provision, 16 CARDOZO L.
REv. 2353 (1995) (discussing causes of past saving and loan associations' failures).
139. In a well-known article, two legal scholars defined securitization as:
[T]he sale of equity or debt instruments, representing ownership interests in, or
secured by, a segregated, income-producing asset or pool of assets, in a
transaction structured to reduce or reallocate certain risks inherent in owning or
lending against the underlying assets and to ensure that such interests are more
readily marketable and, thus, more liquid than ownership interests in and loans
against the underlying assets.
Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization·: Evolution, Current Issues
and New Frontiers, 69 TEX L. REv. 1369, 1374-75 (1991).
140. Mortgage-backed securities are securities whose repayment is backed by a pool of
mortgages. The pool issues securities; and payments on the securities are made from
payments received on the mortgages. Paula C. Murray & Beverly L. Hadaway, MortgageBacked Securities: An Investigation of Legal and Financial Issues, 11 J. CORP. L. 203, 204,
207-08 (1986) (arguing that the local nature of mortgages created capital shortages that
reflected a need for a secondary mortgage market).
14l. Supporters of the secondary market tout that increased standardization has made
the market more efficient, more liquid and thus, profitable and reduced mortgage costs for
home buyers. See Quintin Johnstone, Land Transfers: Process and Processors, 22 VAL. U.
L. REv. 493, 515-16 (1988).
142. See Robin Paul Malloy, The Secondary Mortgage Market a Catalyst for Change
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markets, of which the Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie
Mae") and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac")
are significant players, provide greater liquidity in the mortgage markets. 143
With origins in New Deal legislation, GSEs serve two important
purposes. l44 First, banks are able to resell their mortgages and in turn have
more funds available to make mortgages and other investments. 145 Second,
mortgage rates are stabilized throughout the nation's housing markets. 146
A process of securitization has evolved, which encourages a secondary
market in mortgages and which arguably benefits from a significant
government subsidy.147 Securitization has the added benefit of reducing
information costs, thus making it economically efficient for investors to
participate in this particular market. 148
GSEs, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac are quasi-governmental bodies
with a unique charge and a special status. 149 The governmental charters
in Real Estate Transactions, 39 Sw. L.J. 991, 992 (1986).
143. Murray & Hadaway, supra note 140, at 204-06. Congress created Fannie Mae in
1938. Originally, Fannie Mae was a government corporation with the purpose of
purchasing and reselling FHA guaranteed mortgages in an effort to provide liquidity to
financial institutions with limited access to national markets for capital. See U.S. DEP'T OF
THE TREASURY, GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP OF THE FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE
ASSOCIATION AND THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION 17-18 (1996)
[hereinafter GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP]. Two subsequent Congressional authorizations in
1948 and in 1970 expanded Fannie Mae's purchasing power to include VA loans and nonconventional loans, respectively. Id. at 18-19. Likewise, Congress created Freddie Mac in
1970. Craig E. Marcus, Note, Beyond the Boundaries of the Community Reinvestment Act
and the Fair Lending Laws: Developing a Market-Based Frameworkfor Generating Lowand Moderate-Income Lending, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 710, 756 n.244 (1996). Congress
created the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) in 1968 to take over
the low-income housing programs previously run by Fannie Mae. Congress then
restructured Fannie Mae to become a private corporation with ties to the federal government
and with the authority to buy and sell conventional (non-federally insured) home mortgage
loans. David J. Bleckner, Note, Section 106 of the Secondary Mortgage Market
Enhancement Act of 1984 and the Needfor Overriding State Legislation, 13 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 681,687 n.42 (1985).
144. Murray & Hadaway, supra note 140, at 204.
145. Marcus, supra note 143, at 754-55.
146. Id.; Malloy, supra note 142, at 994. The financial crisis of the Great Depression
created a need to both restore solvency to the nation's lending institutions and regulate and
stabilize the money supply. Thus, the GSEs were created to sell mortgages within a
"closed" market designed to regulate and stabilize the money supply. See Bieckner, supra
note 143, at 683; Murray & Hadaway, supra note 140, at 204-05.
147. Malloy, supra note 142, at 992-99 (discussing the development of the secondary
mortgage market in America). See also Michael Carroll, Masters to Beltway Capitalism,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July 1995, at 60.
148. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
149. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are accorded a special status as GSEs. They are
exempt from paying state and local corporate income taxes, exempt from registering their
securities with the Securities Exchange Commission, and borrow funds at a more favorable
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creating them restrict their operation to the secondary market and require
the GSEs to purchase target amounts of mortgages from underserved low,
moderate, and very low-income households. 150 As purchasers of loans and
not originators, the federal lending discrimination laws do not apply to the
GSES. 151 Accordingly, Congress requires Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to
review their operating procedures and underwriting standards for
discrimination. 152
The presence of securitization in the real estate mortgage market has
created a market dominance that in effect sets the standards for mortgage
loan originations and underwriting. The changes in the financial network
trickle down to the local real estate market and its operations. The liquidity
of the market means that financing is available from unlikely sources.
An assumption that promotes the continued government sponsorship
of the secondary market is that the GSEs counteract lending discrimination
in the primary market. 153 The argument is that by making lending liquid
and profitable, credit is made more widely available to those to whom it
has been historically denied. 154 Securitization combines liquidity and
quality. Quality, however, has been defined in this instance only in
economic terms that benefit the investor, invariably meaning how well the
loan is expected to perform. While measuring the quality of the product
inherently connotes compliance with regulatory and legal guidelines, the
quality evaluation has not translated into any borrower protections vis-a-vis
the original lender.
The GSEs have a ready market for their securities because they have
rate. Schuster, supra note 130, at 156-57. See generally Bradley K. Krehely, Note,
Government Sponsored Enterprises: A Discussion of the Federal Subsidy of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 519 (2002) (explaining the nature of the federal
charter of the two GSEs and discussing the nature and extent of their power).
150. Additionally, the charters limit the amount of a single mortgage purchase to
$207,000. Schuster, supra note 130, at 156-57.
151. Id. at 156-57, 179. "[S]econdary market participants, like Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, are not lenders or creditors as identified by the ECOA." Id. at 179.
152. Id. at 156-57. Securitization benefits the homebuyer. Various studies have
indicated that homebuyers realize a 25 to 50 basis point (.25% - .50%) decrease in mortgage
rates as a result of the presence of the GSEs in the market. See A. Michael Froornkin,
Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 543, 600 & n.12l (1995).
153. See GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP, supra note 143, at 57-58.
154. In a typical transaction, the GSEs purchase mortgages from mortgage originators
and finance them by creating a mortgage pool and selling securities that represent an
interests in that pool. The mortgage originator performs the tasks of processing the
application, checking the borrower's credit and securing the appraisal. The mortgages are
uniform in their age, interest rate structures, and underwriting characteristics. The original
lender continues to participate in the mortgage transaction usually by servicing the loan
pool, for which it receives a fee. Schuster, supra note 130, at 156-57.
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an implicit federal guarantee. IS5 The full faith and credit guarantee
correlates to tremendous cost savings for GSEs. They are not required to
get credit enhancements for their securities. 156 Additionally, GSEs are
exempt from some federal, state, and local taxes, as well as from the
federal securities laws. 157 These advantages create substantial costs
savings for GSE products. IS8 The GSEs, however, were disadvantaged
initially because they were not able to capture the niche product markets
such as adjustable rate mortgages, jumbo or large dollar amount mortgages
or lower quality mortgages. 159 Arguably, the GSEs, as the largest
participants in the secondary market, are undermining the primary market
for mortgage capital. I60 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac dictate the
conditions under which primary lenders can sell loans and primary lenders
conform their own underwriting criteria to meet these specifications. I 61
The effect of securitization is that lenders now make loan approvals based
in large part on whether the loans can be sold on the secondary market. 162
As a result, the secondary market dictates how and why lending occurs in
the primary market. 163 Therefore, greater scrutiny ought to be placed on
the various ways in which the secondary market passively encourages
abusive lending and can actively prohibit it. l64 Similarly, the GSEs receive
155. See Froomkin, supra note 152, at 559, 621 (arguing that GSEs have diminished
market discipline thereby allowing private parties an opportunity to benefit at public
expense with more rigid controls). See Richard Scott Carnell, Handling the Failure of a
Government-Sponsored Enterprise, 80 WASH. L. REv. 565, 583-85 (2005).
156. Froomkin, supra note 152, at 603-05.
157. Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1061, 1120 (1996).
158. Id.
159. The lower quality mortgages are represented by "B," "C," and "D" paper. Id. at
1121.
160. The secondary market has undergone tremendous growth since its inception.
Schuster, supra note 130, at 156-58. The GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, hold about
34% of the four trillion dollars worth of outstanding mortgages for one to four family
homes. Id. at 157. See also U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., STAGE 3: THE LOAN
ApPROVAL OR DISAPPROVAL DECISION, at http://www.hud.gov/pressrel/newsconf/
stage3.htrnl (last modified Sept. 8, 2000).
161. Today, the norm is that many primary mortgage loan applications mirror those
that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac use for the purchase of loans. Also, Fannie Mae has
developed a software program called Desktop Underwriter, which allows a primary lender
to get an immediate response from Fannie Mae regarding the purchase of a loan when the
borrower makes the application. Schuster, supra note 130, at 158.
162. Id. at 157-58, 179.
163. Id. at 179.
164. The argument that the credit market is colorblind is not necessarily borne out by
the statistics. A HUD investigation of discrepancies in lending systems using credit scoring
was met initially with resistance by Fannie Mae, which declared that the absence of data on
race in the underwriting systems indicated a lack of discrimination. Id. at 174. As one

2006]

Democratizing Credit

261

a guarantee fee before passing the remaining portion of the monthly
mortgage payments to the holders of the mortgage-backed securities for
that loan pool. 165
By contrast, federally insured depository institutions issue mortgagebacked securities,166 and must meet capital adequacy requirements and pay
deposit insurance premiums. 167 Securitization has the added advantage of
allowing the seller to sell large volumes of loans and discounting them only
slightly for sale. 168
D. Conclusion: How the Market Protects Subprime Lending

Subprime lending occurs, in part, because there is a credit gap in the
prime lending sector that is filled by subprime lenders. The lending
activities of affiliates of federally insured institutions present an area of
concern for policy makers because these organizations represent what one
research organization has called the "dual mortgage market." 169 A
segmented system of consumer finance has evolved concentrating, it
appears, higher-income homeowners as the main customers of the more
highly-regulated banks and thrifts, and lower income and minority
customers as primary customers of the unregulated banks and thrifts. 170
Information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers affect credit
availability.171 When a seller has market power, its dominance in the
market excludes its competitors from serving disfavored customers. In
tum, that imbalance can lead to "credit rationing"-the denial of loans to
scholar has suggested, such an argument fails to account for the disparate impact of
discrimination that occurs due to the factors that comprise the colorblind system. !d. at 173.
Statistics reported by the Washington Post led however to a different conclusion. !d. at 17475 (citing Kathleen Day, HUD Says Mortgage Policies Hurt Blacks; Home Loan Giants
Cited, WASH. POST. Mar. 2, 2000, at AI).
165. A second way of financing the secondary market transaction is for the secondary
market lender "to issue debt securities and retain the mortgage in the corporation's
portfolio." Id. at 157.
166. Lisa M. Fairfax, When You Wish Upon a Star: Explaining the Cautious Growth of
Royalty-Backed Securitization, 1999 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 441, 448 (1999). Securities
backed by mortgages receive favorable government treatment. Id. at 451-58 (discussing the
benefits of securitization).
167. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1815-1816 (2000).
168. Fairfax, supra note 166, at 449-52.
169. See DANIEL IMMERGLUCK & MARTI WILES, WOODSTOCK INST., Two STEPS BACK:
THE DUAL MORTGAGE MARKET, PREDATORY LENDING, AND THE UNDOING OF COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT i-ii (1999).
170. Id.
171. See Michael Klausner, Market Failure and Community Investment: A MarketOriented Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1561, 1566-68,
1570-72 (1995) (discussing lender's low incentive to invest in obtaining adequate
information in low and moderate income communities).
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would-be borrowers who are observationally indistinguishable from
successful loan applicants. 172
Financial institutions use interest rates as a screening mechanism.
Although higher rates will yield more income from successful projects, the
adverse selection phenomenon means that some lenders are willing to take
on more risk because of the possibility that borrowers will default and not
repay the obligation. 173 Instead of charging higher interest rates to
borrowers who would otherwise be denied credit, financial institutions
simply choose not to extend credit to these "risky" borrowers. Credit
rationing thus creates a gap in the market for credit. The subprime lender
counters the lack of information that causes adverse selection by imposing
oppressive terms upon default. 174
A byproduct of the information asymmetry is market segmentation
that identifies populations of like-situated individuals with representative
proportions of qualified minorities. True risk-based pricing bridges
informational deficiencies and offers a more balanced process of obtaining
information of those who may be creditworthy in low-income
communities. The profit motive, outside of underwriting considerations,
should not provide a basis for lenders who restrict their applicant pool so .as
to neglect minority populations. Conversely, it is unlikely that true riskbased pricing would include a high-risk applicant pool that consists only of
minority applicants.
A dominant seller, such as a subprime or predatory lender, is able to
achieve a high volume of sales in its market segments and, consequently, is
able to lower its prices in its most competitive markets. For the predatory
lender, the very access to markets underserved by primary lenders creates
an advantage and prices the primary lenders out of the market.
A postured justification and economic assumption underlying
subprime and predatory lending focuses on the lender's judgment and
SUbprime lending theory presumes that the
underwriting policies.
transaction and agency costs of lending are evenly calculated. A further
presumption is that all borrowers are treated equally in terms of access to
the application and submitting information that makes them look more
"creditworthy."
172. Id. at 1566; see STEFANIA COSCI, CREDIT RATIONING AND ASYMMETRIC
INFORMATION 8 (1993).
173. COSCI, supra note 172, at 27. Some subprime lenders offer "special 'bottomfishing models' to search for creditworthy candidates among the approximately fifty million
individuals in the United States with credit scores normally too low to qualify for credit."
Lambert, supra note 18, at 2223.
174. Barr, supra note 94, at 535-37.
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The corollary to this presumption is that the lender treats all borrowers
fairly, if not necessarily equally. Many recent studies on mortgage lending,
that have made comparisons across racial lines find that by far, minorities
have not fared as well in the loan application or approval process of
mortgage lending. In the home equity context, the economic assumption of
a fair lender with rational underwriting standards should integrate the
collateral that secures the loan as a variable, thereby making rates and loan
availability indicative of the borrower's actual creditworthiness rather than
the lender's perceived judgments about the borrower's risk.
Although the dominant firm's goal may not specifically be to exclude
rivals, its competitive edge allows it to set prices that serve its own
objectives. Those prices are ultimately profit-maximizing for the dominant
firm and the competitor is forced to follow them.
Lenders argue that subprime borrowers are riskier, and, therefore,
there are higher delinquency and default rates. It is argued that this, in turn,
dictates the high cost of subprime loans and justifies the cost. While
subprime loans carry a high risk of default, it is unclear whether these risks
are caused by the credit condition of the borrower before the loan is made,
or by the loans themselves. This argument is particularly fallacious when
the loan is actually secured by property owned by the borrower.
The most common credit product is the subprime refinance loan.
Most borrowers who lose, or are under the threat of losing, their home
already owned their home before taking the subprime loan. The
tremendously inflated costs of the subprime loan has created most of the
risk of default and foreclosure. 175
III. TOWARDS CREDIT DEMOCRATIZATION - ADDRESSING STRUCTURAL
INEQUALITIES

Law and economics scholars are consistent in their condemnation
when race impermissibly impairs economic efficiency.176 Using risk-based
pricing in inappropriate circumstances is yet another form of redlining.l77
Extending credit on unfavorable terms is always suspect. While the
presumption is that the borrower is well informed and has the ability to
175. See generally Joseph A. Smith, Jr., Financial Literacy. Regulation and Consumer
Welfare. 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 77 (2004).
176. See generally Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Interventions: Toward an Expansive
Equality Approach to the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L. REv.
1025, 1063-66 (2003) (critiquing race, law, and economics).
177. See Jones Havard, Racializing Rural Economic Space, supra note 9, at 341 n.106
(discussing lenders using high agency costs as reason to avoid lending in minority
neighborhoods).
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negotiate, this ability is dramatically curtailed in the present day
environment of mortgage brokers. 178 Since mortgage brokers shop for
loans for borrowers and presumably advise borrowers on the best product
available to them, it is difficult to argue that borrowers are actually
exercising free choice regarding the particular loan products because they
are only being presented with "the best" available product. 179
Furthermore, risk-based pricing founded on stereotypes lacks
neutrality. Lenders making decisions about which products to offer a
particular borrower should base that decision on an assessment of the
loan's performance and profitability. Unfortunately, most risk-based
pricing takes on a decentralized nature instead of a presumed exclusive
one. 180 The lack of specific determinants leads to lending disparities that
could be alleviated if attention was more closely paid to individual
predictors of performance. 181
Unfortunately, the presence of the secondary market makes individual
lenders calloused to the actual performance of the loan. 182 Securitization
allows lenders to divert the costs of subprime loans to borrowers who are
already economically at risk. The lender factors his or her prediction of the
loan's performance into the cost of the loan. 183 Unless and until the
secondary market routinely rejects those lenders who have the highest rates
of foreclosure, subprime lenders will be allowed to be unconcerned about
loan delinquencies, or the costs and consequences of those delinquencies to
individual homeowners. 184 Although borrowers have an incentive not to
default because of the damage to their credit histories, subprime lenders are

178. See Peppet, supra note'118, at 358.
179. See Eggert, supra note 68, at 555 (identifying California and Ohio as two states
that have strengthened their regulation of mortgage brokers).
180. Courts have begun to recognize claims of "reverse redlining" under the ECOA
and FHA. See, e.g., Matthews v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 874, 886
(S.D. Ohio 2002); Hargraves v. Capital City Mortgage Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 7, 20 (D.D.C.
2000); Honorable v. Easy Life Real Estate Sys., 100 F. Supp. 2d 885, 886-87 (N.D. Ill.
2000); see also Assocs. Home Equity Servs., Inc. v. Troup, 778 A.2d 529, 537 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2001).
181. Kenneth G. Gunter, Computerized Credit Scoring's Effect on the Lending
Industry, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 443, 451-52 (2000) (discussing how supposedly neutral
computerized credit scores can have a disparate impact).
182. See Eggert, supra note 68, at 534-35.
183. See Renuart, supra note 25, at 427.
184. Foreclosure data for FHA loans indicates that the rates are increasing. SARAH
ROSEN WARTELL, MILLENIAL Hous. COMM'N, SINGLE-FAMILY RISKSHARING: AN
EvALVA nON OF ITS POTENTIAL AS A TOOL FOR FHA 11, 21 (2002), available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edulmhc/papers/wartell.doc (discussing FHAs objective of
providing finance for affordable housing in light of the conventional market's expanding
role in providing low- and moderate-income house financing).
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actually given a competitive market advantage by targeting borrowers who
may themselves perceive an offer for a risk-based product as their best
option. 185
Justifications
of rigid
subprime
lending
policies
that
disproportionately affect large numbers of minorities must be reckoned
with. These policies are inflexible in that they accept flawed classical
economic theory and render inefficient results when examined from the
perspective of geography and race. 186 The aggregate gains of liberalized
lending must be balanced against the negative effects that these polices
have wrought on individuals and communities. 187
The failure to
acknowledge, and thus, work at remedying why minorities and low- and
moderate-income persons are disproportionately effected destroys the
supposed neutrality.188
A. Informed Risk-Based Pricing

While subprime lending entangles marginal borrowers, admittedly it
provides a source of credit. Regulating subprime and predatory lending
arguably denies access to credit. 189 This is a foreseeable and acceptable
consequence in many submarkets. 19o The differing perspectives regarding
regulation raises an issue of social policy that is particularly appropriate for
legislative consideration. Legislative intervention provides guidance to
bank regulators, whose unfettered discretion leads to uneven results. ~ 91 A
specific law will also provide guidance to market participants who do not
have any incentive to comply without guidance. 192 The questions become:
what information should the market be required to divulge; what are the
identifiable risk triggers; and what punishment should the business face if it
provides inaccurate information, intentionally or otherwise?
185. See Patricia A. McCoy, A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory Lending, 38 AKRON
L. REv. 725, 731-32 (2005) (discussing groups towards whom subprime marketing is
typically directed).
186. See Azmy, supra note 50, at 322-24, 35l.
187. See generally Christopher Jordan Heisen, Comment, Community Development
Lite: An Economic Analysis of the Community Development Financial Institutions Act, 39
How. L. J. 337 (1995).
188. !d.; Azmy, supra note 50, at 346-47, 358.
189. See generally Donald C. Lampe, Wrong from the Start? North Carolina's
"Predatory Lending" Law and the Practice vs. Product Debate, 7 CHAP. L. REv. 135 (2004)
(discussing the limitations imposed on mortgage lending by North Carolina law).
190. "[C]redit is ... a privilege [not] a right .... " Gail R. Reizenstein, A Fresh Look
at the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 14 AKRON L. REv. 215, 215, 237 (1980).
191. See generally Iglesias, supra note 26.
192. Mortgage brokers and real estate brokers are subject to state law regulation. See
generally Murray & Hadaway, supra note 140.

266

Syracuse Law Review

[Vol. 56:233

1. The Need/or Meaningful Disclosures

Contract law is based on the obligation to be bound once the parties
voluntarily assent. 193 This legal premise is no less binding on subprime
loans, notwithstanding the lender's use of standardized documents and the
borrower's inability to understand them. 194 Standardized forms can
become user-friendly and lending decisions transparent. 195 Requiring
lenders to disclose more information about risk-ba'sed loans will help to
remedy the informational deficiencies. 196 The trigger for the disclosure, as
well as the nature and preciseness of the information, is crucial. 197
Arguably, consumers have the right to receive adequate information about
the products that they are purchasing, including home mortgages. 198 One
school of thought is that disclosures are the most efficient consumer
protection because they address the information deficiencies. 199
When the loan price exceeds the base price due to an identified or
stated risk, the borrower needs to know and understand the variance in
pricing. Evidence indicates that the high variance between the two is an
indication that the substantial margin represents opportunistic behavior. 2oo
Pricing information on loans that should be available to consumers includes
The borrower
borrower, mortgage, and property components. 201
component should include credit score and history.202 The property
component should include estimates of the property's market value and a
"range of mortgages that the individual may wish to assume," along with
193. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS §§ 1.1, 3.l (3d ed. 2004).
See Alvin C. Harrell, Basic Choices in the Law of Auto Finance: Contract Versus
Regulation, 7 CHAP. L. REv. 107, 109-11 (2004) (arguing that contracts of adhesion do not
bar consumers from negotiating significant terms).
194. Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. &
POL'y REv. 233,238-42 (2002).
195. Id. at 261-66.
196. See Susan Wachter, Price Revelation and Efficient Mortgage Markets, 82 TEX. L.
REv. 413, 415 (2003)
197. See generally Jan Narveson, Consumers' Rights in the Laissez-Faire Economy:
How Much Caveat for the Emptor?, 7 CHAP. L. REv. 181 (2004) (arguing that consumers
are informed, competent, and the best judges of a transaction's net benefit).
198. Id. at 188-90.
199. See Michael S. Greve, Consumer Law, Class Actions, and the Common Law, 7
CHAP. L. REv. 155, 156-59 (2004) (stipulating that mandatory disclosures can be efficient
depending on the circumstance).
200. Andrew L. Sandler, Consumer Lending: The Next Fair Lending Enforcement
Frontier, in CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION 613, 615-16 (PLI Corp. Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7188, 1997), WL 989 PLIICorp 613 (discussing
cases in which risk premiums exceeded the risks presented).
201. Wachter, supra note 196, at 417 (suggesting further study of a price-revelation
facility that would inform consumers on lenders' pricing determinants).
202. Id.
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any information that is "transaction-specific" to the mortgage. 203
Revealing pricing information is in line with the current trends. 204 The
need to convey this information to consumers in a way that will affect their
behavior is also crucial. 205
An identifiable risk is when a loan is subject to a yield spread
premium. 206 The term should be broadly defined so that it captures those
instances in which the borrower pays the broker to receive a loan at "the
lender's par rate or the lowest interest rate at which a lender will make
mortgage loans without charging the borrower discount points.,,207 An
alternative to regulating the disclosure would be to limit the activities in
which mortgage brokers can engage. 208
Moreover, secondary market purchasers should require more
monitoring from lenders in the ordinary course of business. 209 The
originating lenders should accurately assess the loan's risk and verify the
borrower's ability to re_pay.210 Performing this monitoring task, and
requmng the lender to exercIse due diligence as a standard operating
practice, results in an appropriate level of insight by secondary
203. /d.
204. In revising Regulation "C," the Federal Reserve Board requires lenders to "report
the rate spread between "the APR on a loan and the yield on Treasury securities with
comparable maturity periods, for loan originations in which the APR exceeds the applicable
Treasury yield by a percentage or threshold specified by the Board." Home Mortgage
Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. 7222, 7229 (Feb. 15,2002) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 203).
Lenders must also report borrower characteristics, and the racial and ethnic composition and
income level of the census tract in which the property is located. Id. at 7222. The reporting
requirement is for home purchase loan originations, secured home improvement loans and
refinanced loans. Id. at 7229.
205. As one commentator has said:
In a true risk-based pricing system, prices would either be graduated or display far
smaller discontinuities between prime and sUbprime loans. The secrecy of
subprime rate sheets and the complex, multipart pricing structure of subprime
loans with their bewildering array of nominal interest rates, points, fees, and
prepayment penalties are further evidence of price discrimination.
Engel & McCoy, supra note 66, at 443.
206. See Predatory Mortgage Lending Practices: Abusive Uses of Yield Spread
Premiums: Hearing on 66 Fed. Reg. 53,052 Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and
Urban Affairs, 107th Congo 54-59 (2002) (statement of Professor Howell E. Jackson).
207. Brian A. Wahl, Yield Spread Premium Class Actions Under RESPA: Confosion
Predominates, 19 REv. LITIG. 97, 107 (2000). Lenders determine the par rate daily and
provide it to brokers on a rate sheet. Id. Brokers have little incentive to offer clients the
best rates. Id. at 107-08.
208. Lampe, supra note 189, at 151 (calling for regulating abusive sale practices
through regulations on broker activities). There is certainly the possibility that lenders will
do an end around the regulations and "will compete on some other, less transparent margin."
Greve, supra note 199, at 161.
209. See generally Jones Havard, To Lend or Not to Lend, supra note 47.
210. Id.
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purchasers. 21l Also, consequently, the secondary purchasers can disqualify
for sale those originating lenders who do not meet the appropriate
criteria. 212
2. The Remedy for Failure to Disclose

When there is a failure to engage in informed risk-based pricing, it
must be determined who has been advantaged by subprime lending. The
borrower has economic interests that, when abused, can have a broad
negative impact. It is important to remember, as already noted, that the
borrower is not exercising choice or rationality if she has taken a high-risk
loan based on deficient information. Thus, choice is not "autonomous
decisionmaking" but "a function of the contexts in which people find
themselves. ,,213
Borrowers who are harmed by inadequately sub-priced loans deserve
remedies that compensate the full spectrum of their economic harm.
Adequate protection of borrowers would require that they be allowed to
pursue causes of action beyond common law remedies. At a minimum, the
lender should have to disgorge the profits. This is consistent with what is
done in other contexts for an overreaching injury, including the antitrust
area. 214
This call for unusual penalties is also justified in another way.
Harmed borrowers help fill the enforcement void when they bring
successful law suitS. 215 When economic rights are violated, borrowers will
only pursue claims if the possibility of a fair remedy exists. Thus, the
public perception that the law is willing to both recognize and remedy such
violations is enhanced.
Increasing available remedies to borrowers to include punitive

211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Twila L. Perry, Alimony: Race, Privilege, and Dependency in the Search for
Theory, 82 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2518 (1994) (discussing the "choice" of women who are
homemakers to seek alimony in divorce proceedings).
214. In some areas of law (RICO and copyright infringement, for example), the
resulting harm is considered so egregious that treble damages are awarded. One that is most
closely akin to the violations discussed here is unfair trade practices under a state statute
regulating landlords and tenants. Daniel B. Hill, An Update on Contract Damages When the
Landlord Breaches the Implied Warranty of Habitability: Surratt v. Newton and Allen v.
Simmons, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1699, 1713 (1991) (noting that treble damages can be appropriate
if applied consistently to egregious circumstances).
215. See Greve, supra note 199, at 159-60 (discussing increased rewards for private
enforcers as an option for enforcing prohibitions against unfair or fraudulent business
practices).
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damages might also be appropriate in these circumstances. 216 By
punishing lenders for bad behavior, borrowers are remedied and other
lenders are put on notice, thereby possibly deterring the speculative
behavior. 217
There is economic injury when the failure to inform a borrower results
in an overpriced loan. But further development of this concept of injury
from uninformed subprime lending is the nature of the social injury. While
the law presently fails to compensate for the subtle, psychological injury
that comes from societal oppression, there is a growing need to recognize
that failure to do so is a denial of just compensation.
IV. TOWARDS A THEORY OF ECONOMIC JUSTICE-ROOTING OUT
ECONOMIC SUBORDINATION

As has happened in other settings, subprime lenders are using
economic criteria to construct political and social communities. 218 By
defining borrowers by race and space instead of by objective criteria,
subprime lenders make it unnecessarily more financially difficult for
borrowers to manage their resources. 219 When it comes to access to loan
funds, the supposedly neutral economic criteria becomes racialized. 22o
The absence of governmental intervention must also be considered.
Ignoring structural inequities strengthens the economic subordination of
216. See generally Michael L. Rustad, Punitive Damages in Cyberspace: Where in the
World is the Consumer?, 7 CHAP. L. REv. 39 (2004).
217. See id. at 101 ("Punitive damages are an efficient remedy to punish and deter
intentional ... torts ... where 'the probability of detection is very low and the probability of
harm is very high."') (citation omitted).
218. Race-neutral principles have been constantly challenged in the context of political
rights and voting. Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Questfor Political Equality, 77
VA. L. REv. 1413, 1421-23 (1991) (examining voting rights legislation as a remedy with
twin objectives of political equality and empowerment, and positing that majoritarian
collective decisionmaking must be restructured to ensure meaningful minority interest
representation and participation in the political process). See James Thomas Tucker,
Affirmative Action and [MisJrepresentation: Part Il-Deconstructing the Obstructionist
Vision of the Right to Vote, 43 How. L.J. 405, 440 (2000) (arguing that race-neutral political
solutions create political subordination and defeat the purpose of the Voting Rights Act).
219. See generally Iglesias, supra note 26.
220. Whether the price corresponds to actual gradation in the borrower's riskiness is
not so easily resolved. A non-competitive price may indicate that the predatory lender,
which is sometimes an affiliate of a federally insured financial institution, has allocated that
particular market share due to the lack of competition in the marketplace. Curtailing
predatory lending also calls for more regulation of non-bank lenders in the mortgage
industry. See All Current Proposals for Legislation on Financial Services Reform: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing. and Urban Affairs, 108th Congo 25-26 (2004)
(testimony of Ed Mierzwinski, Director of Consumer Protection, U.S. Public Interest
Research Group, & Margot Saunders, Managing Attorney, National Consumer Law Center).
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subprime borrowers. The unfettered discretion of subprime lenders to
function autonomously in these markets is a great failure of the ideals of
democracy because it allows the maintenance of a status quo that denies
individual liberty in making economic decisions. Individuals who receive
subprime loans when they are eligible for prime loans are denied the true
power of economic choice. This power presumes that choices are
unfettered and that individuals are allowed to make choices detached from
institutional structures of inequality. 221
Critical race theory marries legal theory to the actual lives of
individuals. 222 The theory is premised on identity and the idea that the
experiences and perspectives of the individual are relevant to legal
analysis. 223
Critical race theory identifies these experiences and
perspectives in order to address issues of subordination. 224 The issue of
access to credit is an indisputable exemplar of economic subordination as
addressed by critical race theory. The search for economic justice for
borrowers who are vulnerable in the marketplace raises issues of economic
and racial privilege. 22s
Critical race scholars have begun to develop a theory of economic
wrong, and concomitantly, of economic justice to redress the structural
inequities of race-based economic decisions. 226 The elimination of
221. As Beverly Balos states, "[t]his protection of individual liberty assumes that
choices are made outside the relations of power within which individuals operate and are
unconnected to institutional structures of inequality." Beverly Balos, The Wrong Way to
Equality: Privileging Consent in the Trafficking of Women for Sexual Exploitation, 27
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 137, 171 (2004).
222. See Peggy C. Davis, Law As Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1565-68
(1989) (discussing the law's inadequate response to the psychological effects of racial
discrimination).
223. Charles R. Lawrence III, The !d, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 355-62 (1987) (discussing the law's inadequate
response to unconscious racism).
224. See generally John O. Caimore, Random Notes of an Integration Warrior-Part
2: A Critical Response to the Hegemonic "Truth" ofDaniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry, 83
MINN. L. REv. 1589 (1999).
225. Professor Anthony Cook argues for alternative theories of justice. See generally
Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARv. L. REv. 985 (1990); Anthony E. Cook, The Spiritual
Movement Towards Justice, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 1007 (1992).
226. Critical race scholars have explored the intersection of race and class. See Cecil J.
Hunt, II, In the Racial Crosshairs: Reconsidering Racially Targeted Predatory Lending
Under a New Theory of Economic Hate Crime, 35 U. ToL. L. REv. 211, 279 (2003) (arguing
that the economic loss of home equity by African-Americans through predatory lending is
based on white privilege). See generally Regina Austin, Black Women, Sisterhood, and the
Difference/Deviance Divide, 26 NEW ENG. L. REv. 877 (1992); Regina Austin, "The Black
Community, " its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1769
(1992); John O. Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation: "Hewing a
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economic subordination requires unearthing its ideology to dismantle the
structures that privilege individuals and groups. The access to and
distribution of credit is one such structure. Addressing and developing a
system of fairness in economic matters requires defining what constitutes
the process, outcome, and appropriate level of inquiry.227 The work is
important to reconciling the perceived divide between critical race theory
and law and economics. 228
One way of defining economic justice is by looking to institutional
economics and its focus on the relationship of institutions to individuals. 229
Because neoclassical economics values efficiency, it focuses on the actions
and choices of the individual. 23o The notion of the individual's rational
choice obliterates any inquiry into whether the transaction is just or fair. 231
By definition, neoclassical economics also forbids inquiring into the impact
of race on decision making because to do so would be irrational. 232

Stone of Hope from a Mountain of Despair," 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1233 (1995); Phyliss
Craig-Taylor, Through a Colored Looking Glass: A View ofJudicial Partition, Family Land
Loss, and Rule Setting, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 737 (2000) (discussing partition statutes and land
loss of African-Americans); Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the
Intersection of the Ideology of Motherhood, the Practice of Defaulting to Science, and the
Interventionist Mindset of Law, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1205 (1992); Richard H. McAdams,
Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race
Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1003 (1995); Beverly 1. Moran, Exploring the
Mysteries: Can We Ever Know Anything About Race and Tax?, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1629
(1998); Beverly 1. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue
Code, 1996 WIS. L. REv. 751 (discussing the impact of the tax code on the economic rights
of blacks).
227. Rudolph J. R. Peritz, Introductory Remarks: An Analytical Framework for
Thinking about Economic Justice, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 361, 362 (2003).
Professor Elizabeth Iglesias identifies the three crucial tasks that critical race theory must
address in resolving issues of economic subordination:
The first task is to develop a compelling account of the way law constructs
institutional class structures. Second, it must reveal the way these institutional
structures demobilize and disorganize the collective political identities through
which subordinated groups might otherwise seek to transform the political
economy-for example, as community members, consumers, workers, racial
minorities or welfare recipients. Third, Critical Race Theory needs to imagine the
kinds of institutional arrangements that should replace them.
Iglesias, supra note 26, at 1051.
228. Iglesias, supra note 26, at 1051. See generally CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A
NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002).
229. Charles R. P. Pouncy, Institutional Economics and Critical RacelLatCrit Theory:
The Needfor a Critical "Raced" Economics, 54 RUTGERS L. REv. 841, 844 (2002).
230. Id. at 847.
231. Pouncy, supra note 229, at 842. See Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An
Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2128, 2140 (1989)
(positing that racial domination can come from supposed neutrality).
232. Pouncy, supra note 229, at 847.
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Institutions, for this purpose, are "patterns of thought that impact the
structure, operation, and consequences of all processes in societies." 233
Just as racism is "a belief system about the way things are and the way
things should be,,,234 institutional economics could support a system of
economic justice that is premised upon the expansion of opportunity, and
that takes into account the consequence of economic decision making for
privileged and non-privileged people. 235 The opportunity to participate in
the economy through rightful access to credit can be viewed not as an
individual goal, but as a societal process, and as such, can take into account
historical inequities and oppression. 236
A distinguishing feature of this school of thought is a disavowal of
"natural" markets. 237 The market is necessarily subject to influence and
can be shaped by policy and preferences that result in benefits for some and
Contrasted to the predominant premise of
burdens for others. 238
institutional economics, in which property rights are expected to provide
access to opportunity, is the neoclassical view that the optimal state of
equilibrium is achieved through supply and demand. 239
Another perspective on developing a critical theory of economic
justice examines the legal and regulatory context of institutional economic
power, and the way that institutional economic power creates classes of
subordinated and marginalized persons. 240 An institutional-class analysis
allows for an examination of how disinvestment and racial spaces are
created through institutional and regulatory frameworks. 241 By identifying
the affected interests inherent in institutional class conflicts, the legal
distribution of power is allocated in a manner that perpetuates
subordination. 242 Iglesias posits that what is needed are particular analyses
of the way in which law creates racial spaces. 243 Because decisionmaking
is so ingrained in the power structure, the established power allocations
have become a legitimized hierarchy that is often unchallenged. 244
To pretend that neoclassical economics is pure science negates the
233. /d. at 844.
234. /d.
235. See id. at 848.
236. See id. at 848-50.
237. Id. at 845.
238. Id. See generally Viet D. Dinh, Forming and Reforming Wants, 85 GEO. L.J.
2121 (1997).
239. Pouncy, supra note 229, at 846.
240. Iglesias, supra note 26, at 1051-52.
241. Id. at 1051.
242. /d. at 1052.
243. /d. at 1051.
244. [d. at 1052.
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need to evaluate its oppressive and exclusive outcome. 245 Moreover,
subprime lending that is not adequately priced is a form of economic
subordination. Lenders use manipUlative techniques to induce borrowers to
accept over-priced loans or loans that lead to foreclosure. 246 There is the
mistaken assumption on the part of borrowers that creditors are required to
give them the lowest rate for which they qualify.247 Yet, competition
among lenders is nonexistent because borrowers do not have the
information needed to make comparisons and creditors have no market
incentive to charge less than borrowers are willing to accept. 248
A theory of economic justice can benefit subprime borrowers. While
all subprime borrowers are not minorities, all subprime borrowers are
enveloped in a system of subordination and exploitation. 249 The whole
notion of access to credit is an integral part of the search for economic
justice. 25o The issue thus becomes not just one of discrimination, but, more
importantly, of unearthing the attendant subordination. Especially in issues
involving business law generally, and creditworthiness particularly, there is
the tendency to argue that the neutral market dictates these results. Yet, to
argue that credit is "color-blind" is to ignore the subtle ways in which the
market fails to be either neutral or equal. 251
Developing a theory of economic justice requires articulating a basis
for harm that follows a violation. Again, institutional economics is helpful.
245. As Professor Pouncy states, "Consequently, neoclassical theory intervenes in
society not just to preserve economic inequality, but to recruit the economically oppressed
to cooperate in their own oppression." Charles R. P. Pouncy, Economic Justice and
Economic Theory: Limiting the Reach of Neoclassical Ideology, 14 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
POL'y 11,25 (2002).
246. See Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking & the Limits ofDisclosure: The Problem of
Predatory Lending (Working Paper) (2005) 11 & n.40, at http://law.bepress.com/
aleaJl5thiart2.
247. In her working paper on predatory lending, Professor Willis asserted: (I)
borrowers do not understand the disclosures; (2) the disclosures come after the borrower is
psychologically committed to the transaction; (3) the disclosures are too voluminous,
creating an information overload (although the disclosures must be complex to fully reflect
all price characteristics of the transaction). Id. at 17-19.
248. See id. at 25.
249. See Perry, supra note 213, at 2515 (discussing the need for a clearer intersection
of feminist theory, alimony and critical race theory as it affects the rights of women of color
and poor women).
250. See generally Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory,
42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990) (positing a jurisprudence of reconstruction that evaluates the
intersection of material relations of production and consumption).
251. See Iglesias, supra note 26, at 1037. See also Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the
Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and
Critical Race Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 296, 305 (1991) (arguing that problems of subordination
require a transformation of the status quo).
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It allows for the design of a system of belief that rewards the social,

economic, and psychological harm to the individual. Societal racial
oppression ought to be taken into account when there is an economic
injury. To do so would be to recognize the societal racial pressures that
continually keep minorities from making economic gains. 252 Economic
harms affect the transmission of wealth. 253 Although not conventional to
traditional legal analysis, the subtle injuries that are attendant to a system of
subordination justify compensation. 254
Similarly, the issue of choice must be reckoned with by those
developing a theory of economic justice. 255 Choice makes reference to
rationality and the notion that individuals make autonomous decisions, but
choice may be dictated by circumstances and history.256 Again, ingrained
notions in minority communities about the unavailability of credit may
have developed a perceived notion of access limitations that dictates
behavior. Adapting present day concerns to historical realities is crucial for
measuring harm and developing a theory of economic justice. 257
CONCLUSION
Persistent disparities in the levels of subprime lending reveal a pattern
of racial and ethnic differences in subprime lending. This type of lending
discrimination challenges the unfettered discretion that lenders have in
setting interest rates for home mortgages. The industry practices have
resulted in discrimination that may not be explained by legitimate risk
252. In 2000, Black families had less tangible income than white families as
represented by a comparison of the median income. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT & ROBERT
W. CLEVELAND, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MONEY INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES: 2001 25
(2002). See generally Spencer Overton, Racial Disparities and the Political Function of
Property, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1553 (2002) (examining the economic and social harm that
results from racially discriminatory property laws).
253. I proposed a concept of economic loss when black farmers, denied access to
federal loan funds, lost their land and livelihood. Jones Havard, Racializing Rural
Economic Space, supra note 9, at 344-47.
254. See Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of
Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMIL. REv. 127, 139 (1987).
255. See generally Spencer Overton, Voices from the Past: Race, Privilege, and
Campaign Finance, 79 N.C. L. REv. 1541 (2001) (examining minority campaign
contributions and linking past racial discrimination with existing income, wealth, and
poverty statistics to support the assertion that the distribution of property affects the value of
political liberties).
256. See generally A. Mechele Dickerson, Can Shame, Guilt, or Stigma Be Taught?
Why Credit-Focused Debtor Education May Not Work, 32 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 945 (1999)
(discussing debtor education and credit abuse in the bankruptcy context).
257. W. Sherman Rogers, The Black Quest for Economic Liberty: Legal, Historical,
and Related Considerations, 48 How. L.J. 1, 18-19 (2004).
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factors, and moreover, is very difficult to detect. To avoid the structural
inequality that is the inevitable by-product of such discretion, the law must
require lenders to treat borrowers the same regardless of the race. or
ethnicity of the loan applicant, or the geodemographics of the loan.
Without clear standards regarding risk-based pricing, structural inequalities
among similarly situated borrowers will continue to occur.
Fair lending laws must address these structural inequalities. A theory
of risk-based pricing would take into account the existing disparities based
on race. Specifically, statutes ought to require lenders to apply uniform
standards of risk-based pricing that can be validated and measured.
Penalties, such as the ones suggested in this article, ought to be available
for individuals who are able to demonstrate that the lender has failed to
appropriately evaluate their level of risk. Without such standards, the
subjectivity of the lending decision results in economic harm to borrowers
who should be protected from race-conscious conduct.
Law and policy must also recognize how incongruent doctrines can be
reconciled. There is a need for continued examination of the intersection of
critical race theory and law and economics. Replacing the emphasis on
neoclassical economics with institutional economics points the way for
developing a belief system that values those marginalized and subordinated
by structural inequities. In this instance, a theory of economic justice
protects the interest of all subprime borrowers who are denied fair access to
loan funds. This theory measures the economic harm, as well as the
societal and psychological harm, which results from an unfair transaction.
It is an ongoing task that requires careful thought and attention.

* * *

